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Abstract
We study retention offers, the practice that firms lower prices to con-
sumers that want to cancel their contract. In a two-period Hotelling
model, consumers have either low or high switching costs. In the sec-
ond period, firms try to poach consumers. Consumers with a poaching
offer can solicit a retention offer from their original supplier. In equi-
librium, only low switching costs go though the effort of obtaining a
poaching offer. Hence, retention offers serve as a mechanism to price
discriminate against high switching cost consumers. In our model, the
possibility of retention offers increases prices and profits. Consumer
surplus decreases.
Keywords: Switching costs, retention offers, behavior-based price discrimi-
nation, poaching.
JEL classification: D11, D43, L13.
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1 Introduction
In subscription-type markets, e.g. those for credit cards, cable, telecom,
and insurance, firms are often willing to offer a better deal to consumers
who indicate that they want to cancel their subscription. These offers are
known as retention offers, as firms make them in an attempt to retain fickle
consumers. Consumers’ reactions to these practices differ. Some seem largely
unaware of it, or at least unwilling to exploit such offers. Others actively
chase them, sharing details of current offers on websites like flyertalk.com.
In this paper, we analyze retention offers. We assume that there are two
types of consumers; those with relatively low, and those with relatively high
switching costs. Firms can use retention offers to screen consumers with low
switching costs. Consumers that have already gone through the trouble of
obtaining an offer from a competing firm, signal that they have low switching
costs and hence are likely to switch. Retention offers then effectively serve
as a mechanism to price discriminate against consumers with high switching
costs.
We thus focus on cases where consumers cancel their current subscription
in favor of a competitor. For example, in the UK, Ofcom (2010) reports that
in e.g. mobile telephony, consumers that want to switch have to contact
their current provider and request a code which they must communicate to
their new provider to complete the switch. However, when applying for such
a code, the current provider can, and often does, make a retention offer.
Indeed, this paper was inspired by a similar experience of one of the authors.
After having switched to a cheaper car insurance, he still received a renewal
from the old insurer. He phoned them, the company apologized, asked why
he cancelled his policy, and what price the new insurer charged. It then
offered a price slightly below that – which he was willing to accept. It is
exactly this experience that we try to model in this paper.
We study a two-period model with two firms located at the endpoints
of a Hotelling line. In the second period, firms set prices based on buying
behavior in period 1. In particular, firm B can try to poach consumers from
firm A by charging them a lower price. Once a consumer indicates that she
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intends to switch from A to B to take advantage of that poaching price,
however, firm A can make a retention offer. In the equilibrium of our model,
low-switching-cost consumers strategically solicit offers from the competing
firm to secure a retention offer from their current provider – even if they
have no intention to switch. Soliciting offers requires costly effort, and high-
switching-cost consumers do not find making that effort worthwhile. Hence,
using retention offers allows firms to price discriminate between the two types.
We find that the possibility of retention offers increases prices. Prices for
loyal consumers increase, as this pool of consumers is less likely to switch
on average. But poaching prices increase as well; as low-cost consumers
have already incurred part of their switching costs, they become easier to
poach. Equilibrium prices in the first period also increase. As competition
for consumers with low switching costs is fiercer in the second period, firms
are less eager to attract these consumers in period 1. The welfare effects are
ambiguous. Firms are better off, while consumers are worse off. The latter
applies to all individual high-switching-cost consumers, and to consumers as
a whole. The effect on individual low-cost consumers is ambiguous.
This paper clearly fits in the literature on behavior-based price discrim-
ination. Classic references in this field include Chen (1997), Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000) and Taylor (2003), that all look at multi-period models in
which firms can base the price they charge on a consumer’s purchase history.
Chen and Pearcy (2010) allow consumer tastes to evolve over the course of
the game. Gehrig, Shy and Stenbacka (2011) study the welfare effects of
behavior-based price discrimination in the context of entry deterrence. Yet,
none of these papers allows for retention offers. Our paper adds to the lit-
erature on switching costs, of which overviews can be found in Klemperer
(1995) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007).
Two recent papers, developed independently from ours, do look at reten-
tion offers. Gnutzmann (2013) extends Chen (1997) by looking at retention
offers in a model with homogeneous products and N ≥ 2 firms. In the second
period, consumers can readily observe loyalty prices, poaching prices and re-
tention prices, but have to exert effort 1 to secure the poaching price and
effort α < 1 to secure the retention price. Consumers differ in their cost
3
of effort, i.e. their switching costs. In this paper, different from ours, first-
period prices do not affect second-period actions, as consumers only learn
their switching costs after the first period. Esteves (2014) looks at model
that is similar to ours. She extends the Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) with
the possibility of retention offers. Crucially, however, she does not allow con-
sumers to strategically solicit an offer from the competing firm, in an attempt
to obtain a better deal from her current supplier. In her model, consumers
do not rationally foresee that retention offers will be made.
Finally note that retention offers differ from price-matching policies, in
which a supplier is always willing to match a lower price of a competitor. Such
price-matching policies do not depend on purchase behavior of consumer.
Also, in our model, we will see that the equilibrium retention price is actually
higher than the poaching price offered by the competitor, simply because the
consumer has already revealed a preference for this supplier by her past
buying behavior. Price-matching policies are studied in e.g. Arbatskaya,
Hviid and Shaffer (2004) and Corts (1997).
This paper is organized as follows. First, section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 considers a benchmark in which there are no retention offers, but
there is poaching and heterogeneous switching costs. The model with reten-
tion offers is studied in section 4. We study the effects of the possibility of
retention offers in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 The model
A unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line. Trans-
portation costs are normalized to 1. Firms A and B are located at 0 and 1
respectively and face marginal costs c. There are 2 periods. Consumers have
unit demand in each period, and willingness-to-pay r, gross of transporta-
tion costs. The market is fully covered. Firms and consumers use a common
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
We have two types of consumers: those with high switching costs zH , and
those with low switching costs zL < zH . The share of low types is given by
λ ∈ (0, 1), independent of location. Switching costs are incurred if a consumer
4
switches suppliers in period 2. Switching costs consist of two elements. First,
a consumer has to prepare for a switch, for example by securing an offer
from the competing supplier. Second, she has to effectuate the switch, for
example by actually signing a contract with the new supplier.
For our analysis, it is crucial that actions taken to prepare for a switch
satisfy three conditions. First, they have to involve sunk costs to the con-
sumer. Second, they have to be revocable, in the sense that after incurring
preparation costs, the consumer still has the option to stick to her original
supplier. Third, the costly actions have to be observable to her original
supplier. For example, consider a consumer that considers to switch car in-
surers. She secures an offer from the other supplier, and then makes a phone
call to her current supplier to cancel her contract. The costs involved with
these actions are sunk. However, the switch is revocable: she may still change
her mind and stay with the current supplier. Finally, the current supplier
observes that this consumer has contacted her and, possibly, also that she
has secured a competing offer. Hence, all three conditions are satisfied.
We denote the costs for a type i ∈ {L,H} to prepare for a switch as z1i ,
and the additional costs to perform the switch as z2i . We assume that both














The timing of the game is as follows. In period 1, A and B simultane-
ously set prices p1A and p
1
B, respectively. Consumers observe these prices, and
decide where to buy in the first period. A fraction xˆ1i of type i consumers, to
be determined endogenously, will buy from firm A. The other 1− xˆ1i will buy
from firm B. We will refer to the consumers that buy from A in period 1 as
segment A, and to the consumers that buy from B in period 1 as segment
B. In period 2, the following sequence of events unfolds. In the first stage,
firms A and B simultaneously each set 2 prices, observable to everyone. Firm
A charges a loyalty price p2AA to consumers that bought from A in period 1,
and a poaching price p2AB to consumers that bought from B. Similarly, B
sets prices p2BB and p
2
BA. In the second stage, each consumer decides whether
she incurs preparation costs z1i . If she does, her original supplier can observe
this and can make a retention offer. The retention offer of firm A is denoted
5
pRA, that of firm B is p
R
B.
For the analysis that follows to be valid, we need to impose some pa-
rameter restrictions. These restrictions imply that in the benchmark model
without retention offers for any value of λ some, but not all, low type con-
sumers, and some, but not all, high type consumers are poached in the second
period. Moreover, we want the same thing to be true in the model with reten-
tion offers. As we will show in the analyses below, this requires the following
parameter restrictions to hold;
zL < 1; (1)
zH < 1/3 + 2zL/3; (2)
zH < 1/2 + z
2
L/2. (3)
3 Benchmark: no retention offers
Preliminaries We first consider a benchmark without retention offers. In
that case, the separation of total switching costs into preparation costs and
effectuation costs is immaterial. The timing of this simplified game is thus as
follows. In period 1, A and B simultaneously set p1A and p
1
B, and a fraction
xˆ1i of type i consumers buys from A. These consumers comprise segment A,
the others segment B. In period 2, A and B simultaneously set poaching
prices and loyalty prices. We look for a symmetric equilibrium and solve with
backward induction.
Second period In equilibrium at least some type i consumers in segment
A will be tempted by the poaching price of firm B. The second period will
then have some xˆ2Ai < xˆ
1
i again choosing for firm A, while the remaining
xˆ1i − xˆ2Ai switch to B. Something similar holds for consumers in segment B.




(1 + p2BA − p2AA + zi) ; xˆ2Bi = 12 (1 + p2BB − p2AB − zi) , (4)
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provided that these expressions are strictly between 0 and the relevant xˆ1i .
Parameter restrictions (1) and (2) assure that that is the case in equilibrium.1
Figure 1: Market segmentation in both periods, Benchmark.
Figure 1 depicts this situation. The top panel reflects consumers with
high switching costs, the bottom panel those with low switching costs. In
period 1, those to the left of xˆ1i buy from firm A and thus comprise segment
A.2 Those to the right of xˆ1i buy from B and comprise segment B. In period
2, those in segment A that are located to the left of xˆ2AH will buy from firm
A (as reflected by the arrow), while those to the right will buy from B.
Something similar applies to those in segment B. As zH > zL, we have from






BL: as their switching costs are higher,
fewer high types will switch in period 2.
1To have xˆ2Ai > 0, we need (2 + 3zi − 2z¯) > 0, hence 2z¯ < 2 + 3zi. We want this to be
satisfied for all λ. It is most restrictive for λ = 0, in which case it yields
2zH < 2 + 3zi. (5)
For the high types, this is always satisfied. For the low types, it requires 2zH − 3zL < 2.
In a symmetric equilibrium, we will have xˆ1i = 1/2. For the second period, we thus need
xˆ2Ai < 1/2, hence 2 + 3zi − 2z¯ < 3, so 3zi − 2z¯ < 1. We want this to be satisfied for all λ.
It is most restrictive for λ = 1, in which case it yields 3zi − 2zL < 1. For the low types,
this requires (1). For the high types, it requires 3zH − 2zL < 1, or (2). Note that if this
is satisfied, (5) is satisfied as well.
2We will show below that xˆ1H = xˆ
1
L, as is depicted in the figure.
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≡ (p2AA − c)
[




λ(xˆ2BL − xˆ1L) + (1− λ)(xˆ2BH − xˆ1H)
]
, (6)
where Π2AA (the second line) reflects total profits from loyal consumers, and
Π2AB (the third line) total profits from consumers that are poached. Similarly,






≡ (p2BA − c)
[




λ(1− xˆ2BL) + (1− λ)(1− xˆ2BH)
]
. (7)
For ease of exposition, we define z¯ as the weighted average of switching
costs in the population, and xˆ1 as the weighted average location of indifferent
consumers in period 1:
z¯ ≡ λzL + (1− λ)zH , (8)
xˆ1 ≡ λxˆ1L + (1− λ)xˆ1H . (9)






1 + p2BA − p2AA + z¯
]
. (10)








1 + p2BA − p2AA + z¯
)]
, (11)












(2xˆ1 − 1 + p2AA + c− z¯) .
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(1 + 2xˆ1 + z¯); p2BA = c+
1
3
(4xˆ1 − 1− z¯). (12)












(1 + 2xˆ1 + z¯)2; Π2BA =
1
18
(4xˆ1 − 1− z¯)2. (14)













1− xˆ1 − 1
2
(







(3− 4xˆ1 − z¯); Π2AB = 118(3− 4xˆ1 − z¯)2. (15)
First period We now solve for the first period. Consumers are forward-
looking and rationally take into account the events that will unfold in the
second period. A consumer that is indifferent between A and B in period
1 thus anticipates that, whatever she chooses, she will switch in period 2.
Denoting the discount factor by δ, the indifferent type i located at xˆ1i has
r − xˆ1i − p1A + δ(r − (1− xˆ1i )− p2BA − zi)
= r − (1− xˆ1i )− p1B + δ(r − xˆ1i − p2AB − zi), (16)
where the left-hand side gives her total lifetime utility if she chooses A in
period 1, while the right-hand side gives that of choosing B in period 1. Note
that switching costs zi drop out of this equality; either way, in equilibrium
this consumer will always incur switching costs in period 2, so these do not





1. Solving (16) then gives
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xˆ1 =
1 + p1B − p1A − δ(1 + p2BA − p2AB)
2(1− δ) . (17)









In the first period, firm A sets p1A as to maximize total discounted profits
ΠA = (p
1
A − c)xˆ1 + δΠ2AA + δΠ2AB
= (p1A − c)xˆ1 +
δ
18
(1 + 2xˆ1 + z¯)2 +
δ
18
(3− 4xˆ1 − z¯)2. (19)
Taking the derivative with respect to p1A :
∂ΠA
∂p1A













3− 4xˆ1 − z¯) ∂xˆ1
∂p1A
.
A symmetric equilibrium requires p1A = p
1
B hence xˆ =
1
2
















This yields equilibrium prices
p1A = p
1




We thus have the following:3
3The second-period profit functions (6) and (7) are clearly concave – provided that
firms set prices such that the indifferent high and low type consumers are both strictly
between 0 and 1/2 in equilibrium. Yet, it may still be profitable to do a large defection.
We will show that that is not the case. As in the main text, we focus on segment A.
First consider firm B. It can defect to a price p2BA that is so high that it only sells
to the low types. In equilibrium, that requires setting p2BA such that xˆAH ≥ 1/2, or














Theorem 1 In the benchmark without retention offers, equilibrium first-
period, loyalty and poaching prices are given by



















(8δ − 2z¯δ (2− z¯)) .
In a model with standard Hotelling competition, without poaching or
switching costs, we would have p = ph ≡ c+ 1 in each period. From (1), we
have z¯ < 1, hence ph > pbmloyal > p
bm
poach. Hence, loyal consumers end up paying
a higher price than those that are poached by the other firm (pbmloyal > p
bm
poach).




p2AA + c− zL
)
. At p2BA = p
2
AA−zH , these profits
are decreasing whenever p2AA−zH > 12
(
p2AA + c− zL
)
, hence if zH (λ+ 5)−zL (λ+ 3) < 2.




3zL which is exactly (2). Hence,
we’re on the downward sloping part of piL. Therefore such a defection cannot be profitable.






AA − zL − 1 = c+
1
3
(2 + z¯)− zL − 1 = c+ 1
3
(z¯ − 1)− zL < c,
which is clearly unprofitable.
Now consider firm A. First, it can defect by setting p2AA so high that it only sells to
the high types. That requires setting p2AA such that xˆAL ≤ 0 or p2AA ≥ 1 + p2BA + zL. Its




(1− λ) (p2AA − c) [1 + p2BA − p2AA + zH] ,




1 + p2BA + c+ zH
)
. At p2AA = 1+p
2
BA+zL, these
profits are decreasing whenever 1+p2BA+c+zH < 2p
2
BA+2zL+2 or−2zL− 43+zH+z¯/3 < 0,
which is always the case. Hence such a defection cannot be profitable.
Finally, firm A can defect by setting a lower p2AA, such that it serves all the high types.
In that case the profit function we use in the main text overestimates true profits (since
it assumes a xˆAH > 1/2 rather than the true xˆAH = 1/2). As we cannot find a profit-
increasing defection when looking at an inflated profit function, such a profit-increasing
defection definitely does not exist when looking at the true profit function.
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Also, the possibility of poaching makes competition particularly fierce in the
second period (pbmloyal < p
h). In the first period, the effect is ambiguous. On
the one hand, consumers are less sensitive to first period prices;4 marginal
consumers know that if they are tempted to consume their less-preferred
product, that will imply higher prices in period 2.5 On the other hand,
as switching costs increase, firms are more eager to attract consumers in
period 1, as consumers will be less inclined to switch, so second-period profits
increase.6 As a result, first-period prices are higher (pbm1 > ph) with low
switching costs, but lower (pbm1 < ph) with high switching costs. We also
have:
Corollary 1 The total discounted price paid by both loyal and non-loyal con-
sumers is lower than that in a standard Hotelling model. All consumers are
strictly better off. Firms are worse off. Total welfare decreases.














poach − (1 + c) (1 + δ) = −
1
3
δ (1 + 3z¯) < 0.
These consumers now incur switching costs and a disutility from no longer
consuming their preferred product in period 2. However, if they would choose
not to switch, they would still be strictly better off than in a Hotelling
model. Revealed preference implies that their net utility from switching
is only higher. As total discounted prices decrease an the markets is covered,
profits are lower. For total welfare, prices are just a transfer. With poaching,
some consumers incur switching costs, and a utility loss from no longer con-




= 3/ (6 + 2δ) , whereas in a standard Hotelling
model, we would have ∂xˆ/∂ (pB − pA) = 1/2.






6From (19), in equilibrium ∂ΠA/∂z¯ = δ (1 + 2z¯) /9 > 0.
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suming their preferred product. From a welfare perspective, that is a loss.
4 Introducing retention offers
Preliminaries We now consider the full model and analyze whether there
is an equilibrium in which retention offers occur. We thus look for an equi-
librium where low types that do not switch always pay the retention price
while high types that do not switch pay the loyalty price.
We solve with backward induction and again focus on segment A; con-
sumers that have bought from firm A in period 1. For retention offers to
occur in equilibrium, we need that low types that buy again from A go for
the retention offer pRA, while high types prefer the loyalty price p
2
AA. For the
low types, we thus need that the inspection costs z1L are smaller than the
difference between pRA and p
2
AA, while for the high types the opposite is true.
An equilibrium with retention offers thus requires
z1L < p
2
AA − pRA < z1H . (21)
As we are interested in situations where retention offers indeed occur in
equilibrium, below we will derive parameter restrictions such that these con-
ditions are indeed satisfied. Note that in equilibrium all low types incur the
inspection costs z1L. Hence a low type that decides to switch rather than stay
loyal to firm A, only incurs additional switching costs z2L. In equilibrium, the
loyal high types do not incur inspection costs. Hence, high types that decide
to switch incur an additional zH . We denote by z˜ the weighted average of
these additional switching costs. Hence
z˜ ≡ λz2L + (1− λ) zH . (22)
Second period, second stage In stage 2 of period 2, firm A sets retention
price pRA to maximize profits, given the loyalty price p
2
AA and the poaching
price p2BA that were set in stage 1. All low types have already incurred the
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preparation costs z1L. A low type that switches thus incurs an additional z
2
L
and would pay pRA when sticking to A. A high type that switches incurs an
additional zH and would pay p
2
AA when sticking to A. Hence, the indifferent




(1 + p2BA − pRA + z2L); xˆ2AH = 12(1 + p2BA − p2AA + zH). (23)
Firm A’s second-period profits from segment A now equal
Π2AA = λ(p
R











(1− λ)(p2AA − c)
(
1 + p2BA − p2AA + zH
)
. (24)










Second period, first stage Maximizing (24) with respect to p2AA yields





1 + p2BA + zH + c
)
. (26)




































Taking the first-order condition yields the reaction function
p2BA =





For the equilibrium, we plug in the reaction function of firm A, (26) to find
p2BA =






p2BA = c+ b, (28)
with
b ≡ 4xˆ
1 − z˜ − 1
3− λ (29)
the equilibrium price-cost margin on B’s poaching prices. From (25) and









(1 + zH + b) . (30)









(1 + zH + b) , (31)
provided that these expressions are strictly between 0 and the relevant xˆ1i .
Given that we already impose (1), parameter restriction (3) assures that that
is the case in equilibrium.7 For equilibrium profits for A, we plug these values
7First note that we immediately have xˆ2Ai > 0. To have xˆ
2










1− (λz2L + (1− λ) zH)
3− λ
which is increasing in λ (as the numerator is increasing and the denominator decreasing).

























(1− λ) (1 + zH + b)2 . (32)



















4xˆ1 − z˜ − 1− b) = 1
4
(2− λ)b2. (33)
On segment B, we have a similar analysis that yields







a ≡ 3− 4xˆ
1 − z˜
3− λ
the price-cost margin on A’s poaching prices.
First period Again, the indifferent consumer in period 1 is given by (17):
retention prices do not affect first-period market shares, as the marginal
consumer will always switch. Substituting for p2AB and p
2
BA from (28) and
(34) into (17):
xˆ1i =











(3− λ) (1 + p1B − p1A) + δ (1 + λ)
8δ + (3− λ) (2− 2δ) .
For the low types, this implies z2L < 1, which is always satisfied given that (1) is satisfied.






< 1, which is implied by (3).
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Total profits for firm A are now given by
ΠA = (p
1
A − c)xˆ1 + δΠ2AA + δΠ2AB










(1− λ) (b+ 1 + zH)2 + δ
4
(2− λ)a2. (35)
Taking the derivative wrt p1A :
∂ΠA
∂p1A

























































8δ + (3− λ) (2− 2δ) ,
the first-order condition becomes8
xˆ1 − (3− λ) (p
1
A − c) + (b+ 1 + z˜) δ − 2 (2− λ) aδ
8δ + (3− λ) (2− 2δ) = 0.
Equilibrium requires p1A = p
1
B, hence xˆ = 1/2 and a = b =
1−z˜
3−λ . Solving for
equilibrium prices then yields:
Theorem 2 With the possibility of retention offers, equilibrium first-period,
8It is readily checked that the second-order condition is satisfied as well.
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loyalty, poaching and retention prices are given by
pret1 = c+ 1− 3δ
z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ





(1 + zH + b) ;





1 + z2L + b
)
, (36)






















poach. Again, the comparison
of pret1 and ph is ambiguous.
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Consumers that go for a retention offer thus pay a higher price than what
they would pay if they would switch. As their original supplier knows that
these consumers have a preference for their product, they do not have to fully
compensate for the lower price of the other firm.
Poaching prices are decreasing in switching costs zH and z
2
L: the higher
these, the more of an effort firms have to make to poach consumers. At the
same time, an increase in these switching costs increases loyalty prices, as
9Clearly pretloyal > p
ret
















)− 2 (1− zH)
3− λ
)
The numerator is given by
λ− λz2L + 2zH − 2 < λ− λ (2zH − 1) + 2zH − 2
= −2 (1− zH) (1− λ) < 0
where the first inequality follows from (3). Hence pretloyal < ph. This establishes the ranking.
Finally, note that
pret1 − ph = −3δ
z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(
3− λ2 + λ)
(3− λ)2 .
With λ = 0, this equals δ (1− 2zH) /3, the sign of which is ambiguous.
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firms have to make less of an effort to retain consumers. These comparative
statics are the same to those in the benchmark model. Retention prices
increase in z2L. Only low types end up paying this price, and an increase
in their switching costs makes it easier to retain them. First period prices
decrease in zH and z
2
L. As it becomes harder to poach consumers in the
second period, it becomes more profitable to attract them in the first period.
Hence, an increase in switching costs deceases first-period prices.
In the benchmark model (that added switching costs and poaching to a
standard Hotelling model), we compared the total discounted price, consumer
welfare, profits and total welfare to that in the Hotelling model. It is less
straightforward to do that once we also add retention offers; all comparisons
then become ambiguous.10 Anyhow, it is far more interesting to compare a
world in which retention offers are possible to one where they are not; doing
so allows us to truly evaluate the welfare effects of retention offers per se.
We wil do so in the next section.
As a final technical aside, note that we need some parameter restrictions








z2H − z1H < z2L. (39)
5 The effects of retention offers
Comparing the model with the possibility of retention offers to the benchmark
model, we now have the following:
Theorem 3 Introducing the possibility of retention offers in our benchmark
model has the following effects on prices:
1. First-period prices, poaching prices, and loyalty prices all increase.
2. New poaching prices are still lower than benchmark loyalty prices. New
loyalty prices are higher than benchmark poaching prices.
10See Appendix A for details.
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3. Retention prices are always higher than benchmark poaching prices, and
higher than benchmark loyalty prices if and only if λ is high enough.
Summarizing, we have pret1 > p
bm








Proof. In appendix B.
To see what drives these results, note the following. First, for the low
types, effective switching costs decrease. Ceteris paribus, when viewed in
isolation, this would lead to a lower price charged by firm A and a higher
price charged by firm B (see e.g. equation (12)). Second, the loyalty price
will now only be paid by high types. These are reluctant to switch, leading to
higher loyalty prices. In turn, when viewed in isolation, these higher loyalty
prices also allow firm B to charge higher poaching prices. Both channels lead
to higher poaching prices. Also, note that average effective switching costs
decrease. That implies that firms become less eager to capture consumers in
period 1, hence first-period prices increase.
The welfare effects of retention offers are as follows:
Theorem 4 The possibility of retention offers increases equilibrium profits
and decreases total consumer surplus. Each high type consumer is worse off.
Only some individual low type consumers that end up paying the retention
price, may be better off. Total welfare effects are ambiguous.
Proof. In appendix B.
Hence, although the possibility of retention offers may seem at first sight
to benefit consumers, that is not the case in our equilibrium analysis. In
our model, retention offers serve to screen consumers with high switching
costs from those with low switching costs, allowing firms to effectively price
discriminate against high cost consumers, which hurts such consumers. Yet,
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consumers with low switching costs are often also worse off. They are forced
to incur some of their switching costs in order to qualify for the retention
offer, even if they do not intend to switch. Moreover, this lowers their effective
switching costs, making competition for them less fierce in the first period.
As a result, firms benefit from having the possibility of making retention
offers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the practice of retention offers. In a two-period
Hotelling model, two firms practice behavior based price discrimination. In
the second period, they can try to poach consumers by offering them a better
deal. However, firms can retaliate by making a retention offer. Consumers
differ in their switching costs. In equilibrium, low-switching-cost consumers
always solicit a retention offer, while this is too costly for high-switching-
cost consumers. As a result, retention offers allow firms to effectively price
discriminate against high-switching-cost consumers.
We find that the possibility of retention offers increases firm profits. All
high-cost consumers are worse off, but some low-cost consumers may benefit.
Prices increase. From a welfare perspective, more wasteful switching costs are
incurred, as all low-cost consumers solicit a costly offer from the competitor
in order to secure a retention price.
Appendix A: Comparing retention offers to prices
in a Hotelling model
Corollary 2 In a model with retention offers, compared to a Hotelling model,
1. the total discounted price paid by loyal consumers is lower for low
enough λ and the comparison is ambiguous otherwise;
2. that paid by consumers that switch is either always lower, or is higher
for high enough λ and lower otherwise;
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3. that paid by consumers that pay the retention price is higher for high
enough λ and lower otherwise;
4. firms worse off for low enough λ, and the comparison is ambiguous
otherwise;
5. total welfare decreases.
Proof. First consider the loyal consumers. Using (22) and (36),
P retloyal ≡ pret1 + δpretloyal
= c+ 1− 3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(3− λ2 + λ)





(1 + zH + b)
)
= P h − 3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(3− λ2 + λ)




(zH + b)− 1
2
)




λ (16zH − 15z2L + 7)− λ2 (6zH − 7z2L + 3)− 6zH
(3− λ)2 .
With λ = 0, the numerator is −6zH < 0. With λ = 1, it is 4zH−8z2L+4 > 0,
which is ambiguous. For consumers that are poached, we have from (22) and
(36)
P retpoach ≡ pret1 + δpretpoach
= P h − 3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(3− λ2 + λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(
1− z˜
3− λ − 1
)
= P h + δ
z˜ (4λ− 9) + 6λ− 2λ2 − 3
(3− λ)2 .
For λ = 0, the numerator is −9z˜ − 3 < 0. For λ = 1, it is 1 − 5z2L, which
has ambiguous sign. The derivative of the numerator with respect to λ is
4z˜ + 6− 4λ > 0.
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For consumers that pay the retention price, again using (22) and (36),





= P h − 3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(3− λ2 + λ)
















λ (22zH − 21z2L + 7)− λ2 (7zH − 8z2L + 3) + 9z2L − 15zH
(3− λ)2 .
For λ = 0, the numerator is 9z2L− 15zH < 0. For λ = 1 it is 4− 4z2L > 0. The
derivative with respect to λ is
zH + 2λz
2




+ 7− 6λ > 0.
Profits in a standard Hotelling model are Πh = 1
2
(1 + δ) . We thus have


















(1− λ) (b+ 1 + zH)2 + δ
4
(2− λ) b2 − 1
2
δ.
With λ = 0, we have z˜ = zH and b = (1− zH) /3, so this expression simplifies
to δ (2(zH)
2 − 4zH − 1) /18 < 0. With λ = 1, we have z˜ = z2L and b =
(1− z2L) /2, so the expression simplifies to (3(z2L)2 − 10z2L + 7) /32, which has
ambiguous sign.
This establishes the result on profits. For total welfare, note that prices
are just a transfer. With retention offers, however, some consumers incur
switching costs, while no longer consuming their preferred product. From a
welfare perspective, that is a loss.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3
To prove the Theorem, we will first establish that pret1 > p
bm
1 and then go





Consider the difference between pret1 and p
bm
1 :
∆p1 ≡ pret1 − pbm1 =
−3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ






6z1L (3− 2λ)− zH (3− 5λ)− 4λ− 2λ2 (zH − zL) + 9− 3λz2L
3 (3− λ)2
> λδ
6z1L (3− 2λ)− (3− 5λ)− 4λ− 2λ2 (zH − zL) + 9− 3λ
3 (3− λ)2
= λδ
6z1L (3− 2λ) + 6 + 2λ− 2λ2 (zH − zL)
3 (3− λ)2 > 0.















(1− z¯) = 1
3
λz1L > 0,













































3zH − 3zL + z1L
)
> 0










(2 + z¯) < 0,
as the first term is strictly smaller than 1/2, while the second term is strictly




Above, we showed that pretpoach > p
bm






pretretent ≷ pbmloyal :












λ (1 + 11zH − 6z1L − 12z2L)− 9 (zH − z2L)− 2λ2 (zH − zL)
6 (3− λ) .
This expression is positive if and only if the numerator is positive. For
λ = 0, it equals −9 (zH − z2L) < 0. For λ = 1, it equals 2zL− 6z1L− 3z2L + 1 =














(1− z¯) > 0,
as the first term is strictly larger than 1/2, while the second is strictly smaller
than 1/3. This establishes the result.
Proof of Theorem 4
We now set about proving Theorem 4. We proceed as follows. First, we com-
pare the total discounted prices that consumers end up paying under different
circumstances. These comparisons will prove useful in deriving our results.
We then consider how individual consumers are affected, and look at total
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welfare. After that, we consider firm profits and total welfare, respectively.
The effect on total discounted prices
We can establish the following:
Lemma 1 Introducing the possibility of retention offers often increases the
total discounted prices paid by consumers. The only exceptions are the case
in which a consumer would be loyal in the benchmark, but would either get
poached or get a retention offer when retention offers can be made. Such
consumers pay a lower total discounted price if λ is low enough, but may pay
a higher total discounted price if λ is high enough.




P retpoach > ≷
P retretent > ≷
P retloyal > >
Proof. Results involving P bmpoach follow directly from Theorem 3, as does
P retloyal > P
bm
loyal. Let us now consider the expression ∆Prr-bl ≡ P retretent−P bmloyal. At
λ = 0, we have that pret1 = p
bm
1 , hence ∆Prr-bl = p
ret
retent − ployalbm < 0. ∆Prr-bl =
27δ (z2L − zH) < 0, while for λ = 1, we have ∆Prr-bl = δ (zL + 3z1L − 3z2L + 6) /12 >
0, which implies the statement in the Theorem concerning this case. Finally,
consider the expression ∆Prp-bl ≡ P retpoach − P bmloyal. It can be shown that for




δ (4z1L − 11z2L + 3) , the sign of which is ambiguous.
The effect on consumer welfare
Lemma 2 The possibility of retention offers makes all consumers strictly
worse off, apart possibly from those that pay the retention price in period 2.
Proof. For a single consumer, there are 6 possible options: she is poached
both in the benchmark as well as in the scenario with retention offers; she is
loyal in both cases, she is poached in the benchmark and loyal in the retention
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scenario; she is loyal in the benchmark but poached in the retention scenario;
she is loyal in the benchmark, but pays a retention price in the retention
scenario, or she is poached in the benchmark and pays a retention price in
the retention scenario. We will refer to these 6 options as PP, LL, PL, LP,
LR and PR respectively. Note that not all 6 options necessarily occur in
equilibrium, depending on parameter values, either one may occur.
In all cases, the total discounted price that a consumer ends up paying
is a disutility for that consumer. A consumer that is poached in the second
period has an additional disutility of, first, the switching costs that she has
to incur and, second, the utility mismatch that is caused by the fact that she
does no longer consumer her preferred product. A consumer that pays the
retention price in the second period has an additional disutility that consist
of the additional costs she has to incur to prepare for a switch.
A consumer is worse off with the possibility of retention offers if the total
disutility she ends up with then is higher than her total disutility in the
benchmark. We will refer to the total disutility in scenario x if a consumer
ends up paying a price of type y as Dxy . Going through all possibilities:
PP The net difference in disutility in both scenarios equals that in total
discounted prices. As P retpoach > P
bm





LL The net difference in disutility in both scenarios equals that in total
discounted prices. As P retloyal > P
bm





























LR In this case, consider ∆Drr-bl ≡ Dretretent −Dbmloyal = P retretent + δz1L − P bmloyal.
From the proof of Lemma 1, with λ = 0, we have that P retretent−P bmloyal =
27δ (z2L − zH) , hence ∆Drr-bl = δ (27z2L + z1L − 27zH) < 0. With λ = 1,
we have that P retretent − P bmloyal > 0, hence ∆Drr-bl > 0, rendering the net
effect ambiguous.
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PR In this case, consider ∆Drr-bp(x) ≡ Dretretent −Dbmpoach(x). As we will see
below, it is now important to take into account that the disutility of a






L − P bmpoach − δzL − δm(x)
= P retretent − P bmpoach − δz2L − δm(x),
with m(x) the mismatch of a consumer located at x ≤ 1/2 that gets
poached: this consumer’s transportation costs are now 1 − x whereas
they would have been x if she consumed her preferred product. Hence
m(x) = 1−2x. From the proof of Lemma 1, with λ = 0, we have P retretent−
P bmpoach < 0, hence ∆Drr-bp(x) < 0. With λ = 1, we have ∆Drr-bp(x) =
1
12
δ (13− 6z2L + 12zL − 5zH)− δ (1− 2x) , which is ambiguous.
Lemma 3 Total consumer welfare decreases with the possibility of retention
offers. This holds both for the high types as well as for the low types.
Proof. For the high types, this follows directly from Lemma 2 (note
that high types never pay the retention price). The analysis for the low
types is more involved. Consider segment A in the benchmark scenario.
Total disutility of the low types that are loyal is given by xˆbmAL · Dbmloyal =







P bmpoach + δzL
)
, as these consumers pay P bmpoach and also incur
switching costs in the second period. Moreover, each of these consumers
incurs a mismatch: her transportation costs are now 1−x whereas they would
have been x if she consumed her preferred product. Hence m(x) = 1 − 2x,












Hence total disutility of the low types in the benchmark is given by















Along the same lines, with the possibility of retention offers, it is given by















Figure 2: Effect on disutility of low types of the possibility of retention offers.




































The figure gives the upper and lower bound of the effect of the possibility of retention
offers on total disutility of the low types, as a function of lambda.
It turns out to be impossible to compare these two expressions analyti-
cally. We therefore resort to a numerical analysis. For all values of λ, Figure
2 gives the upper and the lower bound on the net welfare effects for the low
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types of the possibility of having retention offers (thus on DretL − DbmL as








From the figure, we have that welfare of the low types may improve with
retention offers for low enough λ. Only for those λ, we saw that the low types
that buy from A in both scenarios do pay a lower price under retention, while
the number of low types that gets poached decreases, lowering their costs of
mismatch. For low λ, these positive effects outweigh the negative effects of
a higher poaching price and costs to secure a competing offer.
Note that we have not weighted the loss by the number of low type
consumers, which makes the graph easier to read.
The effect on profits
First note that equilibrium profits would obviously increase if all total dis-
counted prices in the retention scenario would be higher than those in the
benchmark. Unfortunately, that is not the case. From Lemma 1, consumers
may end up paying a lower price if they are loyal in the benchmark, but are
either poached or pay the retention price in the case where retention offers
are possible.
With a unit mass of consumers that always buy in equilibrium, finding
the scenario with the highest profit is equivalent to finding the scenario with
the highest average price. Focusing on segment A without loss of generality,
we have that the average price paid in the benchmark is given by














11The analysis was done in MATLAB. For each of 100 values of λ between 0 and 1,




H , as well as z
2
H to find the highest and the lowest
possible value of the price effect of retention offers, taking into account the conditions







conditions (1)–(3), (38) and (39)). The analysis took 21 minutes on a 3.30 GHz 4GB RAM
Windows 7 PC. The MATLAB code is available upon request. Looking at a finer grid did
not appreciably affect the outcomes. Note that in all figures, we have taken δ = 1. The
size of δ does not affect the qualitative analysis, however, as all comparisons we consider
are proportional to δ.
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With the possibility of retention, it is given by














It turns out to be impossible to compare these two expressions analytically.
We therefore resort to a numerical analysis. For all values of λ, Figure 3 gives
the upper and the lower bound on the price effect of the possibility of having
retention offers (thus on P¯ ret − P¯ bm, as defined above), for all admissible




H , and z
2
H , using an analysis very similar
to that described above.
Figure 3: Effect on average price of the possibility of making retention offers.
































The figure gives the upper and lower bound of the effect of the possibility of retention
offers on average prices paid in equilibrium, as a function of lambda.
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From the figure, it is immediate that average prices with retention are
always higher than those in the benchmark. As λ approaches zero, the price
difference disappears. This is intuitive: with λ = 0, the number of low
types is zero, so no retention offers will be made, rendering the case with the
possibility of retention offers identical to the benchmark.
Figure 4: Effect on welfare of the possibility of making retention offers.



























The figure gives the upper and lower bound of the effect of the possibility of retention
offers on total welfare, as a function of lambda.
The effect on total welfare
Figure 4 reports on an analysis that is very similar to that in Figures 2 and
3, but now for total welfare.
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